This complete documents was downloaded from the GulfLINK site recently, all 33 pages of it. I have processed it to a reasonable size and I believe that anyone who is interested in the decision making process relating to vaccines used in the Gulf, then this document is a must!

 

120396_sep96_decls1_0001

File:120396_sep96_decls1_0001.txtPage: 0001<br>

Total Pages:33

Subject:MPOD 3821 CHRONOLOGY

Unit:OTSG

Parent Organization:HSC

Box ID:BX003202

Folder Title:CHRONOLOGY

Document Number:1

Folder SEQ #:29Z,

UNCLASSIFIED

MPOD #3821) Chronology

 

 

1.8 Aug 90

m program with substantial amounts of BT likely to have been produced and probably weaponized. Also AX, Cholera, Staph Enterotoxin B (SEB), and Clostridium Perfringens mentioned.

* First mention of BW in monitored message traffic by J-4/MRD.

* Led to questions about prophylaxis and treatment since not previously covered in CW materials presented to J-4.

 

2.11 Aug 90 - PHONCON with MAJ Eng (Army SG) regarding

biological vaccine stockpiles.

* Army bagan purchasing vaccines three years ago in small amounts for both BT and AX.

* Stockpile is outside normal distribution system (with Army Med R&D Command).

* Army TSG tasked Prof Services on 11 Aug to determine policies associated with recognition/detection, sampling for definitive diagnosis, and appropriate treatment regimens.

 

3.16 Aug 90 - CAT Action responding to request by Air Marshall Hayr (MODUK). Asked for the right source to discuss BW Protection Plans and treatment of possible casualties. Copy of ONATO Handbook on medical Aspects of NBC Defensive operations- sent via Army Surgeon General's UK Liaison (LTC Lyondeane).

4.21 Aug 90 - AFMIC information brief on intelligence collection efforts associated with BW threat to J-4/MRD staff. Provided clinical overview of prophylaxis, side effects associated with vaccines, and other treatment information.

 

5.22 Aug 90 - Threat and recommended treatment protocols briefed by J-4/MRD to the three Services Surgeons Generals, ASD(HA), and J-4 DDPAR. First time information on the BW threat and potiential treatment (vaccine) communicated to the ASD(HA) level by the Joint Staff. J-4 attempt was to solicit vaccine policy position from ASD(HA) using the weekly forum (similar to Defense Health Council concept) for decision making.

 

Consensus reached to vaccinate entire force in the AOR.

DASD(MR) was to staff issue to SECDEF for policy decision to immunize all US forces.

* MG Russell, Commander, Army Med R&D Command, discussed with CENTCOM Surgeon, the BW threat and current availability of vaccines. Indicated Med R&D would continue involvement with FDA to expedite necessary consent-form waivers. MG Russell retired before it could become clear what the CINC,s position might be on vaccinating the troops.

 

6.24 Aug 90 - Memorandum thru the Army Surgeon General from MG

Russell, for ASD(HA) strongly recommended planning for construction of additional facility utilizaing every possible means at hand to expedite the project. Recommended executive managment responsibility be given to Army Med R&D Command with oversight by OSD.

7.24 Aug 90 - ASD(Atomic Energy - Mr. Richardson, Deputy for Chemical Matters) visited DDf4R (ADM Smyth) regarding the status of Bw preparation and role of the Joint Staff. Mr. Richardson indicated his office was in charge of BW matters as well as all chemical matters. (Not true for biological, however). More of an introductory visit. Believe he was fishing for information.

 

, "Anthrax Vaccine

Treatment for Human Protection Against BW Threat." Identified potential for threat, the known protection (i.e., vaccination), source of vaccines, and status of the increased production effort.

* Army SG EXUMS and Information Paper written on medical defense against AX and BT.

 

9.29 Aug 90 - ASH(HA) meeting held. J-4/MRD (RADM Smyth) attended. Resulted in Information Paper further outlining information on both BW agents. No real taskers from meeting, other than to reaffirm the medical position to vaccinate all US troops in AOR, ASAP.

 

 

30 Aug 90 - DOD Armed Forces Epidemiological Board Memorandum for ASD(HA) recommended that:

 

* AX immunization commence ASAP, beginning with units and personnel at greatest risk of exposure, administered on a 0, 14, 28+ day schedule.

* BT immunization of selected forces at greatest risk of exposure commence ASAP, administered on a 0, 14, and 84 day schedule (pentavalent).

 

11. 4 Sep 90 - ASD(HA) memorandum to CJCS, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Vaccination and Immunization Against BW Agents." Included two information papers with medical recommendations. Requested review of draft decision papers which had been prepared by ASD(HA) for SECDEF. Papers outlined medical protocols, regimen and symptomatology.

12.6 - 12 Sep 90 - J-4/MRD, Thru CAT (SOA 503), staffed 136 action to Services requesting approval and release of ASD(HA) draft decision papers (reference 4 Sep entry above). Several Service planners opposed to package, as written, based on failure to include operational considerations. From period 6-12 Sep, clarification actions persisted in an effort to finalize the 136 action. 136 action never completed-became OBE when copy of ASD(HA) package 'mysteriously" provided SECDEF, who gave issue to CJCS. Action "killed" in CAT. According to DJCS, special group will be formed to investigate issue.

13.13 Sep 90 - Generalized confusion regarding quantities of vaccines available; unit cost information. Called Army Med R&D Command (COL Lewis) for verification of previously obtained information. Provided to DDMR (ADM Smyth).

 

S Public Affairs (CDR

Barron) regarding task from DJS to form a special group to develop proposed PA guidance for the BW Vaccination Program. Under the auspices of J-5 (Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs - BG Jumper), RADM Smyth and COL Fry (J-4, MRD) and COL Lewis and LTC Crumrine (USAMRDC), along with CDR Barron met to develop Qs&As.

15. 18 Sep 90 - Joint Staff/J4-DDMR requested Michigan Department of Public Health (MDPH) Lab be nominated into the Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP). Submitted request through J4/Chief,

 

Mobilization and Logistic Planning Division to FORSCOM (DOD proponent).

 

16.18 Sep 90 - Note received from DJCS on the need to put together, on a priority basis, a briefing for the JCS to be held on 21 Sep in the TANK. Specifically, background to threat along with medical analysis were to be covered jointly by J-5 and J-4. Key to this would be the early-on involvement of each Surgeon General (invited to TANK session).

17.20 Sep 90 - First viewgraph made depicting "US Personnel

Fully Vaccinated"

Attempted to show supply and demand relationship, graphically.

18.21 Sep 90 - SOA 503 (CAT Action) closed. DJS tasked J5 and J4 to provide a briefing on vaccination against BW agents. This was accomplished in the TANK on 21 Sep.

19.21 Sep 90 - "Special Topic" briefed in the TANK to the Operations Deputies by J-4 (RADM Smyth) and J-5 (BG Jumper). Followed by afternoon briefing to the Joint Chiefs. Covered the following:

 

* Background; use of chemical weapons by Iraq; Iraqls BW capability to produce, weaponize, deliver, cover and tactics; indications and warning for both CW and BW; medical analysis of CW and BW agents with treatment regimen; defensive capabilities against CW and BW agents.

* Bottom line: decisions necessary were no longer 'medical" in origin; rather were political, social, and military/operational. Also, no matter what decision made, insufficient vaccines (both for AX and BT) to cover all US forces at risk existed.

 

Chairman indicated the need to update issue every two weeks.

20.25 Sep 90 - AX Production Charts provided DJS with

explanation regarding commencement of production and vaccination as number of people to be vaccinated over time.

 

21.27 Sep 90 - Army Med R&D Command Information paper generated on the regulatory status of AX and BT vaccines. Forwarded to DJS by DDMR/ADM Smyth. Reemphasized safety issues associated with both vaccines and that waivers being sought from FDA were administrative in nature and not related to safety issues rumored.

 

22.28 Sep 90 - DJS asked question of "who makes decision to increase production of BW vaccines?" Copy of ASD(HA) memorandum (done by SGRD-ZA), "Industrial Base for Vaccine Production" forwarded with note from DDMR outlining role USA Med R&D Command assumes and the formation of a Tri-Service that a task force established for the purpose of investigating mechanisms to increase current production capability.

23.2 Oct 90 - VCJCS memorandum to SECDEF "Expansion of

industrial Base for Biological vaccine Production." Outlined main points concerning US ability to produce BW vaccines and recommended SECDEF designate ASD(HA) as focal point to express alternatives to increase production. Included a draft memorandum with suggested milestones suitable for ASD(HA) from SECDEF.

24.3 Oct 90 - J5 memorandum written for SECDEF with attached draft memo for the President which outlined recommended decision

to delay a program of vaccination while building vaccine

inventories ASAP. (Not known whether memo was actually

transmitted to President.)

 

25.3 Oct 90 - SECDEF memorandum to ASD(HA) on "Expansion of Industrial Base for Biological Vaccine Production." "As a matter of priority, take necessary action to acquire a second source to produce biological vaccines to protect against known Iraqi biological capability." Suggested milestones attached.

 

onventional Forces and Arms Control Policy

* Bill Inglee) memorandum through Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy, International Security Policy (Mr. Hadley) to SECDEF/DEPSECDEF "Proposal to Vaccinate Against Biological Agents." Recommended approval of principle to immediately begin vaccination program for US personnel against AX and BT; direct immediate expansion of AX vaccine production. Memo to SECDEF from International Security Policy (Sheila Buckley), Director for Multilateral Negotiations endorsing position.

 

27.5 Oct 90 - Series of Information Papers written by J4/MRD (input from Army Med R&D Command) regarding vaccination plan for both AX and BT vaccines (how teams were constituted, proposed distribution and transportation plan).

28. 5 Oct 90 - ASD(HA) memorandum for SECARMY, "Expansion of Industrial Base for Biological Vaccine Production." Chartered Tri-Service Task Force (headed by Dr. Peter Collis, DASD(MR)) to investigate industrial base and develop short and long-term objectives. Industrial base and short-term objectives to be completed by 12 October; long-term objectives by 19 October.

 

29.9 Oct 90 - VCS Army briefed by CRDEC on "Biological Threats in the Middle East; US Troop Vulnerabilities and Recommended Countermeasures." Recommendations included a push to move out on incorporate medical countermeasures, and lock in surveillance doctrine. Bottom line: briefer was "slammed-dunked" due to the exorbitant costs ($37M) associated with proposal. Briefing was supposed to be informational and not a decision brief. VCSA told briefers to go back and do more work. Col Lewis (Army Med R&D Command) furnished copy of briefing with charts to Joint Staff for information.

 

28. 6 - 10 Oct 90 - DJS asked for Information Paper on

prioritization issue (i.e., who should receive inoculation of

limited DOD stocks). Question posed to the CAT (SOA 714) and

worked by J3. While a spinoff from a previous J4/J5 issue,

prioritization was worked by J3/JOD. Paper was written with J3

perspective with copy provided to J4/J5. Final disposition - not

submitted formally to the DJS. Information on prioritization

scheme was used to develop further assumptions regarding who

ceive inoculations.

29.12 Oct 90 - Additional cost and schedule information

(resulting from 9 Oct meeting) presented to Army DCSOPS by Army DAMO-SWC.

30. 15 Oct 90 - visited SECDEF; BW threat discussed.

31.17 Oct 90 - Phoncon with CINC Surgeon (COL Belihar) asking for length of time it would take to vaccinate AOR given certain planning assumptions. Requested ASAP. COL Belihar called DDMR

 

later in afternoon to iterate the position of the CINC was to not vaccinate.

32.17 Oct 90 - Second TANK session held to update OPSDEPS and Joint Chiefs on status of all BW efforts.

 

* Chairman expressed concern about timing requirements to vacciante in-theater US forces as soon as AX vaccine quantities permit.

* Noted that Navy was the only Service to support an immediate vaccination program in AOR.

* Reaffirmed all prior decisions of 21 Sep TANK briefing

 

33.18 Oct 90 - Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP) Vulnerability Survey accomplished under auspices of FORSCOM. Report indicated:

fencing not effective; lighting only minimal; no formal key and

lock program; no intrusion detection alarms; only two security

officers; tunnel network under lab. Bottom line: "Facility is

particularly vulnerable to undetected penetration by potential

intruders for the purpose of stealing the product or for

committing acts of destruction against its facilities.,,

 

34.18 Oct 90 - Joint Staff/DDMR memo to DJS clarifying

production issues highlighted in the 17 Oct TANK briefing. ASD(HA) requested to get FDA approval issue off center and resolved. Also, DDMR contacted BG Smith (FORSCOM/J5) on acceptance of the Michigan Lab into the Key Asset List. Iterated sensitivity associated with Lab and importance to the Joint Chiefs that FORSCOM move post haste to enroll facility into program.

35.19 Oct 90 - Joint Staff/DDMR message (19123OZOct9O) to CINC, "Desert Shield in-Theater Vaccine Administration." Sent under Nike Air (SPECAT) with a response required NLT 24 Oct.

36.21 Oct 90 - AMEMBASSY RIYADH message to SECSTATE, IIBW: vide AX injections to All Military Personnel."

 

Provided concern for civilian Populations at risk and dangers associated with not vaccinating civilians while vaccinating military members. Strongly urged Washington officials to think through implications.

 

38.24 Oct 90 - CINCCENT/Surgeon message (2415220ct9O) to Joint Staff/DDMR, "Desert Shield in-Theater Vaccine Administration.,, Sent under Nike Air (SPECAT). Was response to Joint Staff message of 19 Oct. CENTCOM approach to theater AX vaccination developed; program Information shared with J5 (BG Jumper) and DJS.

39.25 Oct 90 - Memo from DDMR (ADM Smyth) on status of AX production; summary in preparation for 2 Nov TANK brief; new contracting/construction activities and short and long term goals (i.e., preliminary on status of Tri-Service Task Force). Query given to Dr. Collis (DASD(MR)) as heads-up.

40.25 Oct 90 - DJS transmitted chart to CJCS (presently in the AOR) concerning production of vaccines. Chart showed number of US personnel capable of being vaccinated with AX over time.

 

41.31 Oct 90 - Army Med R&D Command background paper submitted to J4/DDMR regarding US position to conduct an offensive biological warfare R&D program. The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (Articles I and X) allows for production of and research on biological agents for purposes of prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Given to J4 for general information.

42.2 Nov 90 - Third TANK informational briefing held with OPSDEPS and Joint Chiefs. Key issue: "who" to innoculate and o start. overview provided included:

 

* Capability assessment with additional production

possibilities;

 

vaccine inventory analysis;

No change in threat; AX vaccine production has been

maximized could be vaccinated by end May 91

and by end Dec 91); and that information on additiona

AX and BT vaccine proudction would be due from the Tri-Service Task Force on 19 Nov 90.

43.5 Nov 90 - Question regarding shelf-life of AX vaccine posed to DDMR by DJS. Chairman apparently was asked this while at a social event. From COL Lewis: only a matter of FDA extending shelf life of various expired lots. Not anticipated to be a problem.

44.6 Nov 90 - Memo from ASD (Atomic Energy-Mr. Richardson, Deputy for Chemical Matters) sent to addressees (J5 and J4), "Biological Warfare Meeting" to be held on 9 November. Purpose was to provide basic BW data.

45.6 Nov 90 - Memorandum for Record (USAMRID/Dr. Linden) concerning "Phone Conversation with Dr. Bob Mikulak." Highlighted the possible ramifications, in the context of the provisions of the Biological Warfare Convention, of the Army undertaking the production of large numbers of doses of BT vaccine. Reaction was that production of such large quantities falls within permitted activities of the BWC.

46.9 Nov 90 - Meeting attended by J4 MRD representative.

Proposed agenda included introduction, threat, medical effects of biological agents, dissemination, laydown patterns, downwind hazards. OSD group would continue to meet in order to develop a set of policy questions to provide direction to CIA so that all bases are covered.

 

47.9 Nov 90 - Trip to Michigan Department of Public Health Lab (Lansing, MI) by J5 (BG Jumper, COL Fleming) and J4 (ADM Smyth, pose: Determine problems and prospects affecting production of BW vaccines. visited the Director of the Lab (Dr. George Anderson) and the Chief of Biologic Products Division (Dr.

Robert Myers).

* Increases in AX vaccine production favorable. Follow-on estimates are for additional vaccine for late-March, yielding ability to protect late May, thereafter rising by thereafter. There is need for an additional fermenter, however.

 

* MDPH has suspended production of BT vaccine in favor of AX vaccine. Existing BT stocks exist in three forms: people already turned over to Army; doses for addit:Lo=na" now being blended at MDPH; and a final quantity sufficient for that has not been blended and packaged at MDPH (Total BT on and (by mid-Jan 91) will innoculate

5 USC 522(b)(1)

48.9 Nov 90 - J5/DDPMA (BG Jumper) formed a working group consisting of DIA, J3 J4, J5 to assure accurate tracking of vaccine production. The group meets weekly, producing status reports, prospects, and problems.

49.10 Nov 90 - DASD(MR) (Dr. Collis) met with DDMR (ADM Smyth).

Latest information provided regarding progress of Tri-Service Task Force. Indicated short-term production report ready on-time (19 Nov). Dr. Collis carried a message from the new Army Med R&D Commander (MG Travis) requesting Joint Staff consider assigning executive agent (preferably Army) for procurement and production of vaccines with a small task force formed for production and procurement under oversight of TSG of the assigned Service.

 

50.13 Nov 90 - BUMED instructions issued to forward Navy medical lab (in AOR) regarding the collection and transportation of suspected BW incident specimens. Navy forward lab has capability to identify those BW agents considered to be major threats within theater.

51.16 Nov 90 - DOD working group consisting of the DASD

(Conventional Forces and Arms Control Policy - Mr. Inglee), DDPMA

(BG Jumper), and the

I traveled to s about

US responses to Iraq's BW threat.

u eam prov ded information

requested by earlier meeting with SECDEF.

 

* BG Jumper provided summary of BW threat and general overview of US defensive capabilities (to include vaccines).

Briefing showed existing inventories fell short of

requirements in the near term.

 

 

52.16 Nov 90 - COL Lewis furnished latest information on MDPH fermenter. New fermenter installed and pre-production testing is beginning. Provided to BG Jumper and DJS by DDMR.

53.19 Nov 90 - ASD(HA) (Tri-Service Task Force) Report to SECDEF on "Expansion of Industrial Base for Anthrax and Pentavalent Botulinum Toxoid Vaccines Production." Two separate reports outlined courses of action available to increase production of both vaccines.

 

54.19 Nov 90 - ASD(HA) memorandum to SECARMY, "Expansion of Industrial Base for Biological Vaccine Production.,, Forwarded Tri-Service Task Force's report on short term production of AX and BT vaccines.

 

 

* Requested steps be taken on a priority basis to monitor ongoing efforts at MDPH (increased production by 20 Feb 91); begin contract with by 15 Feb 91; establish intergovernmental arrangement with bv 15 Feb 91; modify contract to produce serotypes E

and C BT with of serotype E produced by 15 May

91, followed by of serotype C; modify contract

with MDPH to renovate their facility to allow for simultaneous production of multiple serotypes of BT by 1 Sep 91.

* Evaluate mission priorities of USAMRIID, by 15 Dec 90 to determine if BT can be produced.

 

Task Army Surgeon General to establish and be executive

manager of an Implementation working Group (led by flag officer-BG Ron Blanck) to expedite all actions.

55.19 Nov 90 - Initial information on quantities of antibiotics (doxycycline, ciprofloxacin) and plague vaccine furnished by COL Lewis to DDMR and BG Jumper.

 

Concern about plague was voiced

 

 

Equine heptavelent botulinum antitoxin status reported.

Contract for bleeding and production being negotiated with

(where "First Flight" horse now resides). Additional horses under procurement.

56.21 Nov 90 - DA OTSG sent tasking from SECARMY to form Task Force to evaluate ways to increase production of AX and BT vaccines. Implementation working Group, chaired by BG Blanck, would provide weekly production reports to DASD(MR).

 

 

57.21 Nov 90 - Fourth TANK informational briefing held. No change to Iraqls ability to weaponize; no changes to information on high capacity spray devices said to be in Iraq. Provided an update on the availability of both vaccines, the status of drawing blood from Iraqi defectors and results of consultations with the

 

 

Tri-Service Task Force report reviewed. Recommended MDPH

maintain accelerated AX vaccine production; establish

production at

Institute. Can vaccinate

starting Apr 91.

5 USC 522(b)(1)

* Can vaccinate for BT now with by mid Jan; establish production at initiate renovation of Michigan facility; establish production at Ft Detrick, with nd with exsiting inventory of A and D (Porton to produce strain E and C).

* Reported that defectors from Iraqi Republican Guards still in custody of Saudis; US has not had access. Blood would reveal types and strains of BW agents they have been protected

 

60.27 Nov 90 - BG Blanck briefed on the Tri-Service Task Force history and its recommendations. Set his first meeting for 30 November. Will consist of representatives from Health Care Logistics, Operations, and Preventive Medicine plus USAMRDC.

Began:

* For AX vaccine: 1621161@VVAIII is preparing a proposal in response to draft RFP in anticipation ot signing a contract. Confidentiality agreement being worked with Michigan. Earliest production - 1 Apr 91. Commander, USAMRDC authorized NCI to spend up to $200K to initiate work until Inter-Agency Agreement is finalized. Renovations of the NCI facility begun. Working with FDA to resolve licensing issues related to biologicals. Earliest production - 1 Apr 91.

* For BT vaccine: USAMRDC officials meeting with

on 3 Dec. Will present RFP to elicit commitment

and determine extent to which can produce vaccine.

Earliest production could be as late as I May 91. MDPH is to

 

 

 

 

5 USC 522(b)(1) provide an estimate of renovation costs to place 3 fermenters on separate floor of Lab, first week in Dec. Earliest production from these fermenters - 1 Oct 91. USAMRIID visited by technical representatives from to determine which areas could be used for production and renovations required. Commander USAMRDC to brief BG Blanck before 5 Dec. Earliest production is contingent upon availability of immunized personnel.

61.29 Nov 90 - More definitive information on availability of antibiotics (Ciprofloxacin) 500 mg tablets provided by Army. ty to meet DOD requirements. if order placed within next 72 hours, can deliver 15M 500 mg tabs in bottles on or before 21 Dec 90. Additionally, by 15 Jan 91, a second batch of 15M 500 mg tabs can be delivered, and thereafter approximately 500K to 1M tabs daily. Army has budgeted enough Doxycycline for This is not the antibiotic of choice.

5 USC 522(b)(1)

62.30 Nov 90 - Information Papter on Iraq's BW Threat prepared by J5 for use by CJCS during 3-5 Dec. Recapped 16 Nov DOD/Iriteragency Working Group meeting where MODUK and others stated positions on defensive measures/political pressures associated with defensive initiatives.

 

63.30 Nov 90 - Fifth TANK informational briefing held. No change to Iraq's ability to weaponize. Provided update on availability of both vaccines, development of antitoxin, use of antibiotics, development of BW detection devices, and consultations with the

 

* SECARMY formed implementation working group on 21 Nov 90; vaccine production plan on schedule. Optimally, potential combined AX vaccinated population could be

every 6 weeks starting Apr 91. Can protect by 15

Jan. will have RFP for BT vaccine production on 3

Dec; Ft Detrick facility assessment to produce BT due 5 Dec;

can now protect

* Development of antitoxin (works for BT only), against all 7 strains ongoing. Works past exposure if administered before symptoms appear; can protect

 

 

* Availability of antibiotics (works for AX only). Works past exposure if administered before smyptoms appear; can protect by 1 Jan - by 1 Feb. Uncertain downside (medical impact) when removed from antibiotics.

* Development of BW detection devices. (Antibody detection technique) tells when to remove protective gear (test results in 30 minutes); 6 samplers can be fielded in 90 days. mommm&lwj technique) tells when to put on protective gear;

 

 

* Consul a concern.

 

 

kcioxycyc-LinE), antitoxin serum (tor BI-). interagency working group formed to develop US response if vaccination program (DOS lead).

* No change in CINC's position ... does not want to begin vaccination program until all troops can be protected.

 

 

Decision options: affir, requirement, antibiotic/antitoxin production, development/deployment of sampler kits; when to begin inoculations; who to receive vaccine.

64.1 Dec 90 - Medical BW Defense Action Plan, prepared by Army

Surgeon General's office, briefed to VCSA (LTG Sullivan). (Furnished by COL Lewis for Joint Staff information). Plan covers initiation of vaccination against AX; maintenance of AX vaccine at selected hospitals (for post-exposure treatment); issuance of antibiotic packets by 15 Jan for post-exposure treatment; initiation of vaccination against BT (CINC's priority); and maintanence of BT antitoxin stocks at selected hopsitals within theater. Questions/comments on insufficiency of vaccine stocks, mobilization of the US industrial base, priority for vaccinating members, and use of antibiotics issued to members. VCSA apparently stated money not a problem ... Army should push forward! Plan offered for use in preparation for next TANK session.

65.3 Dec 90 - J5/BG Jumper outlined course of action needed prior to next TANK session. Need to push toward total integration of all planning efforts associated with BW defensive measures. Get Service planners (specifically A and AF) on use of BW detectors. VCSA has tasked Surgeon General to get plan together (public affairs, psyops, POLMIL, medical, doctrine). Draft memorandum to SECDEF prepared by J5/COL Fleming requesting SECDEF direct accelerated procurement actions to improve the US biological defensive posture. Memorandum was not finalized.

66.3 Dec 90 - ASD (Atomic Energy - Mr. Barker) memorandum to SEC

ARMY and SEC AIR FORCE, "Biological Agent Detection Capability.,,

ked Army to lead the development of a biological detection

capability with the goal of having a redundant detection capability in theater by 15 Jan 91. The plan will be provided by 7 Dec. An integrated program review will be held 11 Dec to define funding requirements. Army is convening a multi-service group to develop appropriate doctrine and intends to field three detection systems by 15 Jan 91.

 

* XM-2 Air Sampler (Bw agent identification kit). Two of these systems are available and are awaiting ARCENT direction to deploy. each AX and BT testing "tickets" may be available in AOR by 15 Jan. CINCCENT will determine disposition of these units.

 

 

BW detection of location and size of clouds and othr suspended particles with limited discrimination capability). Army is working with AF and DOE to mount package in a suitable aircraft. DOE is procuring a second system to provide redundancy.

 

67.3 Dec 90 - J5 (COL Fleming) hosted Service planners meeting to discuss potential for a follow-on TANK briefing (either informational or decisional) for 7 Dec. Wanted to insure that all Services were working toward an integrated program (per the ASD

= tasker referenced above). Overview of previous TANK sessions and outcomes presented.

5 USC 522@b@1)

68.ec 90 - Update prepared for DJS by J5/COL Fleming on biological defense measures. Report included: status of vaccine production (unchanged); medical treatment initiatives (antibiotics and antitoxin, unchanged); biological detection systems (plan to be provided by 7 Dec 90 for redundant detection capability).

69.7 - 8 Dec 90 - Eyes Only message from CINC to CJCS expressing concern about "who" and "when" to immunize.

70.10 Dec 90 - Paper submitted to ADM Smyth and BG Jumper on

"Rationale for Antibiotics in Prophylaxis Against Inhalation Anthrax" (Rhesus Monkey Paper). Research effort has been used in considering the use of antibiotics following exposure to AX and before initiation of symptoms. Only one monkey died following treatment with 30 days of Ciprofloxacin antibiotic.

71.11 Dec 90 - Information received from COL Lewis that 40 samples of blood were delivered on Sunday, 9 Dec 90, to USAMRIID (from Saudi officials) for testing against AX, Plague, Tularemia,

CHF, Sand

Fly Fever, Clostridium Perfringens, and Smallpox. Results should be available the morning of 12 Dec for all except BT (ready on 14 Dec). There is no good test for smallpox.

72. 11 Dec 90 - Sixth TANK briefing (decisional) held. Updated intelligence, availability of vaccines, antibiotics, antitoxin, BW detection devices, consultations with

 

* INC inputs: Continues to be concerned about

effectiveness of antibiotics, panic among oilfield workers, sensationalized media coverage. Ready to support Washington decision but needs help in prioritizing.

Joint Staff Goal: Have adequate BW defense by 15 Jan.

 

CJCS expressed concern that US measures include more than just vaccination. Suggested, focus be changed to accentuate positve aspects of BW defensive measures . . . what we can do, not what is unavailable. Asked questions of clarification concerning the antibiotic recommendation and requested civilian medical authorities as well as those military validate this treatment regimen. Must be a total integrated program.

 

All agreeded that a strong robust biological weapons

protection program should begin. "When" to begin and "who" should receive vaccinations remain unanswered.

 

73.12 Dec 90 - CJCS memorandum drafted for SECDEF which suggests initiation of an interagency effort to coordinate public affairs program and recommends:

 

* immediate implementation of robust biological weapons protection program to include deployment and distribution of antibiotics and antitoxin. Begin inoculations with available vaccine stocks as an additional level of protection.

* making available to US allies and friends, information necessary to obtain their own supplies of antibiotic protection.

 

notifying

consulting with the governments of Saudi Arabia and other Guld states and nd the appropriate measures that can be taxen to maintain puoilc confidence.

74.12 Dec 90 - AMEREMB (Riyadh) to SECSTATE Msg, "Biological

 

 

 

 

the Anti-Iraqi coalition associated with their inoculation program. Cautioned that plight would be all the worse, in that the Embassy "has never issued guidance to American citizens on what to do in case of chem attack."

75.12 Dec 90 - J5 received Department of State issued paper,

"Managing Fall-out from British BW Inoculations." Paper

highlights courses of action available to U.S. which range from

consultation with other governments and press lines, dealing with

other coalition armies, stockpiling medicines for civilian use,

gas masks (and blister packs) for U.S. civilians, surplus British

AX vaccine, and protection for children. Issues requiring

ches to other governments,

how to deal with coalition partners (i.e., offer antibiotics?),

whether to stockpile antibiotics for use by civilians, provide

advise to other governments on organization of antibiotic program,

stockpiling of gas masks (or full CW protective gear) for AMERCIT

 

 

 

civilians, and whether or not to advise

surplus AX vaccine.

 

 

76.12 Dec 90 - J4 coordinated on DASG draft message, "Country

Clearance for Biological Defense Preventive Medicine (PM) Team." message is for preplanning purposes and will be ready to drop into system based on go ahead to activate plan. Suggested less specificity (i.e., reference to BW) in message. Indicated that team should probably remain in Washington area until such time as the draft warning order is completed.

77.13 Dec 90 - J5 Response Cell: comments to State Department paper, "Comments on DOS Inoculation Paper." Key point made: initial thrust of State paper is wrong. Recommended US approach not be a reaction to the "our own initiative to frame the problem in our own context" and that the focus should be shifted from managing to us management of overall biological defense program.

78.13 Dec 90 - J5 (BG Jumper) asked question concerning US ability to stockpile gas masks in theater for issue to US civilians. J4 research indicated quantities of gas masks are sufficient to meet US military needs in the immediate future;

 

79.14 Dec 90 - Armed Forces Epidemiological Board met to consider the use of antibiotics as an adjunct in countering the threat of inhalation AX. Issue was posed before the Board as a result of the CJCS's concern during 11 December TANK briefing that civilian professional opinion be sought regarding use of antibiotics. Subject was also highlighted during weekly ASD(HA) meeting on 15 December, by RADM Smyth.

80.17 Dec 90 - Information paper (from SARD-TM/COL Lewis),

"Production of Large Quantities of BT and AX PA Protein for Use in

Development of Medical BW Defense Measures." Answered the

issue of whether or not the production of large quantities of BT

(to be used in the formulation of BT (vaccine) and large

quantities of AX PA protein to produce AX vaccine was in

contravention of the Biological Weapons Convention? Answer: NO.

 

 

 

 

81.17 Dec 90 - CJCS Memorandum prepared for SECDEF, "Response to

Iraq's Biological Warfare Threats." Provided complete review of known BW capability and the several levels of protection that presently exist. Recommended implementation of robust BW protection program, to include deployment and distribution of antibiotics and inoculations; making available, information on how to obtain own supplies of antibiotic protection to US allies and friends; UK be advised of US decisions; governments of Saudi Arabia, Gulf states and Israel be consulted on close-hold basis. Additionally, requested immediate coordination with interagency and agreement on public affairs program. Memo may have been shared with President by CJCS.

82.17 Dec 90 - Inforamtion on "Q Fever" provided by COL Lewis to

J4 (ADM Smyth). Points out that Q is endemic in Middle East and SWA. Provided J5.

83. IL7 Dec 90 - "Results and Analysis of Iraqi Serum Samples" received. Included test results and analysis done by USAMRIID. "Positive samples conform to plausible expectations resulting from natural exposure to endemic disease agents or non-specific cross reactions." Pointed out dilemna about "chain of custody."

84.17 Dec 90 - Armed Forces Epidemiologial Board memorandum

"Recommendation Concerning the Use of Ciprofloxacin" sent to three Surgeons Generals and ASD(HA). Copy forwarded to J4/RADM Smyth.

Board concurs with the use of ciprofloxacin as an adjunct countermeasure against inhalation AX;

reemphasized doctrine for use;

strongly recommended specimens be cultured, identified and

tested for antibiotic sensitivity using resources available

r;

iterated previous recommendation of 30 Aug 90 to commence immunization of Operation Desert Shield forces to AX and other ptoential biological threat agents, ASAP, beginning with those units and personnel at greatest risk.

85.18 Dec 90 - Memorandum for JR/RADM Smyth from COL Lewis regarding his summation of the 17 Dec Armed Forces Epidemiology Board meeting.

 

 

86.16 Dec 90 - Draft J5 Warning Order reviewed by J4. Indicated

SECDEF had approved implementation of comprehensive biological defense program that includes deployment of biological detection systems, distribution of antibiotics and botulinum antitoxin, and initiation of a vaccination program among CINCCENT assigned forces. Was not finalized.

 

87. 18 Dec 90 called

regarding how to enhance security of thel J4

furnished copy of FORSCOM Security analysis. Mr. Rostow's plan is

to first contact FORSCOM followed by contact to Dr. Myers. He is

considering a potential visit to the Governor. Does not believe

= at the moment.

5 USC 522(b)(1)

88.20 Dec 9 - CJCS Letter of Appreciation prepared by J5 for

Dr. Robert Myers, Michigan Department of Public Health Laboratory.

89.21 Dec 90 - J4 Information Paper, "Transfer of Consumables to

Coalition Forces in Support of Operation Desert Shield." J5 asked question regarding procedures to follow in tranfering consumables (i.e., antibiotics) to coalition forces in support of ODS. Under normal circumstances, FMS criteria. Expedited procedures for transfer of consumables in support of the coalition have been established under "blanket" authority by State. CINC determines availability of requested item and is the approval authority for such transfers. Provided to J5 (LTC Bice).

90.21 Dec 90 - Public Affairs guidance redrafted by CDR Barron

(joint Staff PA) and J5. Will be used to counter press allegations, should British make formal public announcement of their program.

91.21 Dec 90 - J5 wanted recommendations regarding who should rnational group that would be used to "confirm" actual use of CW/BW. J4/RADM Smyth spoke with Dr. Mendez: indicated World Health Organization, International Red Cross, Communicable Disease Centers.

m @ potential

members. COL Lewis suggesteu had

experience in BW testing. Also, urnis ect information regarding

range of times for AX and BT to make both clinical and

confirmatory diagnoses. Clinicallv m

hours). Confirmatory: @ater,

using Phase Microscopy Lde of

5 USC 522(b)(1)

 

theater, using peritoneal inoculation of guinea pigs. Discussed

possibilities of using other than US laboratories to make

confirmation that agents had been used. Concerned about the

 

 

92.21 Dec 90 - COL McCarty (USAMRDC) called to inform J4 that

the had been approached by

WHO wi e responsit)iiity to coordinate an interntional team of

experts who could be used to identify BW agents in "emergency

relief and disaster situations." to

RADM Smyth with copy provided to COL Fleming (J5), for

information. This effort could become the core for the

international confirmatory group.

 

93.22 Dec 90 - News article Washington Post, "FDA Consents to

Use of Unapproved Drugs on US Desert Troops." Article indicates new "interim rule" established at DOD request allows flexibility in countering effects of chemical and biological weapons ... policy gives FDA authority to permit administration of investigational new drugs and biologics without informed consent of soliders.

94.24 Dec 90 - Warning order remains with DJS. Has not been finalized.

95.24 Dec 90 - Telephone call received from CDR Barron (joint

Staff Public Affairs), concerning FDA news article. J4/COL Fry indicted office responsible for coordinating with the FDA was the ASD(HA)/Dr. Mendez.

96.28 Dec 90 - SECDEF approved implementation of deploying detectors/systems, distribution of antibiotics, antitoxin, AX and Bot T vaccines in support of ODS. Advance warning and planning for DOD directed improvements.

97.28 Dec 90 - SECDEF/ASD-PA msg (291848ZDec9O) on "Public

Affairs Guidance - Chemical and Biological Defense Program," eleased.

 

98.29 Dec 90 - ASD(HA) letter to FDA Commissioner of Food and

Drugs (Dr. David Kessler, MD) requesting a determination that

obtaining informed consent is not feasible for the investigational

 

 

agent pentavalent botulinum toxoid vaccine because of military combat exigencies in ODS.

99.31 Dec 90 - JR(LRC) message (31220OZ Dec 90) to CENTCOM Rear, priority movement of biological vaccines and personnel in support of ODS. Requested priority assignment of aircraft, provided weight and cube information.

100.31 Dec 90 - Response to ASD(HA) letter to Dr. David Kessler,

MD received. Based upon the ASD(HA) assessment of the military operation, Commissioner found that there is no available satisfactory alternative therapy for the prevention of botulism and concurred with the informed consent waiver proposal. FDA determination to expire in one year.Late December through 18 Jan 91 - The issuance of chemical defense equipment (gas masks) for American citizens discussed by Interagency working group and J5.

 

101.3 Jan 91 - CINC received briefing from his NBC staff on the

CONOPS associated with the detector systems contemplated for use in the AOR. Indicated detectors should be stopped from shipment until a more detailed analysis and review of the plan could be accomplished. A DCINC "Personal For" msg to ADCSOPS on issue was sent. J4 (DL) called J4 (CENTCOM) in effort to help break bottleneck loose to give detector equipment top priority for shipment and forward placement. Turns out CINC's concerns were reason for delay . . . no bottleneck!

102.5 Jan 91 - CENTCOM msg (051444ZJan9l) issued on "BW Defense

Medical Guidelines". Failed to emphasize masking as prime defensive measure. J4 (DDMR) called CENTCOM Suregon; asked for added emphasis in follow-on msg.

103. 8 Jan 91 - Updated assessment by USAMRDC on status of be provided weekly.

104. 9 Jan 91 - Biological/Chemical Defense working Group (Medical-Technical) convened under auspices of Army Surgeon General to draft two working papers on medical defense against biological materials and detection of biological materials. J5 (DDPMA) has final responsibility of all Interagency members for classification and clearance.

105.9 Jan 91 - Handling and decontamination of BW contaminated remains and mortuary affairs overview conducted in TANK by Army and J4.

 

106.10 Jan 91 - J5 meeting with OASD (Deputy for Chemical

Matters, Dr. Richardson) to discuss in-theater laboratory capabilities and detection systems. Working toward identifying best detection capability to send to AOR.

107.10 Jan 91 - Shipment of gas masks, ponchos, and rubber gloves for use by up to 621@ directed by Interagency

0

Deputies with target aate tor arriva in AOR, 15 Jan 91.

108.DJS requested updated information from J4 on BW initiatives:

 

 

 

* 20 Million Ciprofloxacin (antibiotics) being readied for

distribution.

 

* Bot T vaccine production (USAMRIID) and AX line at NCI nearing construction completion.

* 100 horses currently undergoing inoculation for production of Bot antitoxin.

* FDA waiver authority granted concerning informed consent for Bot T vaccine.

 

 

109.13 Jan 91 - CENTCOM msg (13133OZJan9l) "BW Defense Medical

Guidelines" issued. Emphasized use of mask.

110.15 Jan 91 - CENTCOM msg (151422ZJan9l) on "Doctrine for Use of Antibiotics for BW Defense".

111.16 Jan 91 - #7 TANK session (information). Intelligence assessment, production, status of vaccinations, availability of medicines, detection, third country requests and gas masks for civilians covered. Wanted CJCS to sign memorandum to Army requesting Army develop BW defense plan by 1 May 91.

112.19 Jan 91 - CENTCOM msg (19123OZJan9l) to DAMO-SWC-AOC on biological defense initiatives. wished to move forward with systems felt to contribute to ongoing operational efforts.

Indicated did not require aerial detector because it did not

meet operational requirements. Wants deployment of ground-based

detectors and chemical company, remainign XM-2 samp-

remote sensing chemical agent alarm (RSCAL), equipmen,

computer assisted BW hazard prediction system (ANBALIS

by Defense Nuclear Agency.

 

113.27 Jan 91 - CENTCOM msg (27135OZJan9l) to ARCENT on

deployment of biological detector team and operational concept BW detection, warning, and identification. Covered capabilities of teams, deployment of first time (to arrive 27 Jan) with second arriving as airflow permits; employment at sites throughout AOR.

114.29 Jan 91 - Two pamphlets jointly developed

technical advisors sent to AOR and DOS for distribution. (See item 101.)

115.5 Feb 91 - CENTCOM Surgeon indicates blood drawn from EPWs for BW diagnostic purposes was done by Saudi officials. US acted as courier only in sending specimens to US Army Institute for Infectious Disease. Grave concern over protecting rights of EPWS.

116.7 Feb 91 - J5/J4 forum to discuss detector systems which might be ready for shipment to AOR. Looked at detector tickets (XM2 sampler); how to resolve on-site versus lab analysis (which takes 24 hours for results). USAMRDC (LTC Crumrine) working with Army ODCSOPS to resolve.

117.9 Feb 91 - CENTCOM request to USAMRDC received for support in obtaining BW defense information: use of various antibiotic combinations against AX and requirement for literature on use of antibiotic (Ciprofloxacin).

118.4 Mar 91 - CENTCOM msg (041803ZMar9l) "Termination of AX and Bot T Vaccination Program". Indicated personnel not required to complete series, if begun.

 

 

119.5 Mar 91 - Vaccine production problems surfaced by

DASD(MR-Dr. Collis) "Project Badger" working group: liability ens industry; no commercial market for orphan vaccines;

industry does not have time sensitive flexibility; industry does not have secure locations; industry not responsive to unique military needs and infectious disease requirements.

120. 6 Mar 91 - - results received on EPW blood specimens. Deter ination could not be made regarding whether or not EPWs had been immunized against suspected BW agents.

 

 

121.8 Mar 91 - CENTCOM Surgeon msg (081808ZMar9l),

"Investigational Drug Status" released. Provided overview of Pyridostigmine Bromide (nerve agent pretreatment) status and status of Bot T vaccine . . . participation voluntary, no categorical denial by unit, vaccination not portrayed as mandatory by CINC but participation rate very high in those populations designated for vaccination. Also indicated vaccination programs for AX and Bot T discontinued due to diminished threat. First time information concerning the "voluntary" vice "mandatory" nature of vaccine administration surfaced by CENTCOM. Joint Staff, et al believed program was "mandatory" for those populations chosen to receive vaccines. J4/DDMR called to verify this with CENTCOM Surgeon (COL Belihar).

122.5 Apr 91 - According to CENTCOM Surgeon, approxjmatplv m MM I

Marines received second BT vaccine w eMn program stoppect. Indicated problems encountered were defining the threat and making a threat assessment in order to have good program managment. Lacked good intelligence on capability and intent.

123.9 Apr 91 - TANK #8 session (information). Current worldwide

BW threat and generalized requirements briefed by J5 (BG Jumper). Joint Chiefs endorsed production of sufficient biological defense stocks to protect the FY 1995 active Force (1.6M) and directed Army to provide a concept briefing for defensive biological operations NLT end FY 91.

124.24 May 91 - CJCS memorandum to SECDEF (CM-893-91) indicated efforts by Army as Executive Agent for BW defense need to continue; provided minimal goal of protection for the FY 1995 recommended that BW defense be designated as a priority requirement to ensure that Army, as DOD executive agent, has authority to correct deficiencies.

125.27 Jun 91 - Representatives from Services, Joint Staff met on the need to form a Joint Services Committee on Biological Defense. MG Del Rosso (ODCSOPS) explained Joint Committee required to accomplish mission to revitalize efforts to meet worldwide BW threat.

 

 

126.8 Jul 91 - Army Operations Deputy Memo to DJS on Joint

Committee on Biological Defense requested DJS take action to

 

appoint CSA as JCS Executive Agent and to charter Joint Service Committee on Biological Defense.

127.15 Jul 91 - AdHoc Joint Committee on Biological Defense

(under auspices of DADCSOPS, MG Del Rosso) met with representatives from Services, Joint Staff and OSD to designate BW defense a priority requirement, gather intelligence requirements, and develop lead Services for working group. Set up future meeting schedule.

128.31 Jul 91 - DJS Memorandum to Army Operations Deputy indicating that only one Executive Agent is required in order to avoid dual chains of responsibility . . . unnecessary to appoint both a DOD and JCS EA as SECARMY already serving as DOD EA.

129.16 Aug 91 - Freedom of Information Act request received by

Joint Staff on behalf of the Public Citizen Litigation Group for information concerning the use of vaccine for botulinum on US military personnel stationed in the Persian Gulf during ODS. Joint Staff response indicated that release of certain information would highlight vulnerabilities and capabilities which could interfere with ability to respond rapidly in the future to identified chronic shortages in the industrial base.

130.26 Aug 91 - DEPSECDEF memorandum directs SECARMY to be

Executive Agent to design an integrated DOD response to BW threats which includes production and stockpiling of vaccines/antitoxin; development and fielding appropriate detection systems, protective and decontamination systems and coordination/issuance of joint BW defensive doctrine by 30 Sep 91.

131.29 Aug 91 - Biological Defense Committee Meeting conducted by MG Del Rosso (AODCSOPS). Attended by Service representatives, included brief review of Terms of Reference; updated foreign BW agent threat assessment (by ; decontamination efforts to include review of requirements, current and future efforts, funding profiles, problem areas and timelines; existing biological defense physical protection programs; detection system working group efforts; vaccination policy and vaccine production efforts . . . Army's production capacity is at maximum . . . experiencing problems obtaining FDA approval due to full scale vaccine production efforts. MG Del Rosso indicated work groups must continue efforts to refine issues and establish procedures to enhance communication across work groups and push vaccination policy issue . . . near and far-term policy based on production capability. Scheduled next meeting for 19 Sep.

132.19 Sep 91 - Second meeting of the Biological Defense

Committee Meeting conducted by MG Del Rosso (AODCSOPS). Attended

 

 

by Service representatives, Joint Staff and OSD staff members.

Synopsis included review of biological defense plan outline;

reviewed TANK briefing format; updated assessment with

commitment by ents at least

quarterly; updated vaccine production capabilities . . . current

analysis indicates that under current Production, vaccinating a

.IT& achieved until FY 94 and that at no time under current production will sufficient stocks exist to allow a to be vaccinated against Bot T . . . perhaps by FY 02; reviewed methodology on how to determine vaccination requirements; decontamination procedures; work of the biological detector group effort. MG Del Rosso indicated that work groups are responsible for writing their portions of the plan with this due to Army by 18 Oct. The Committee's objective is to provide OSD with a Bio Defense Plan to address operational issues . . . subsequent policy decisions addressing vaccination of the force will come from OSD. Set next meeting for 26 Sep 91.

133.26 Sep 91 - Third meeting of the Biological Defense

Committee Meeting conducted by MG Del Rosso (AODCSOPS). Attended by Service representatives, Joint Staff and OSD staff members.

134.3 Oct 91 - Fourth meeting of the Biological Defense

Committee Meeting conducted by MG Del Rosso (AODCSOPS). Attended by Service representatives, Joint Staff and OSD staff members. Synopsis included review of threat assessment and slides for TANK briefing . . . stressed importance of showing why we are concentrating on only AX and Bot T and not the entire threat list;

rk group work . . . Navy has

established new core programs, Air Force has not; physical protection work group progressing but with acknowledgment that previous work has been directed on the chemical threat with no development and testing to address the biological threat; vaccine production on line; status update on detection technologies is tentatively scheduled to be briefed to OSD (Mr. Singley) on 17 Oct. MG Del Rosso closed meeting with the fact that the work group task list will drive preparation of the Plan. Scheduled next meeting for 18 Oct.

135.9 Oct 91 - TANK #9 session (information) provided by Army.

Briefing attempted to outline four basic BW defensive

imperatives: vaccination, detection, protection, and

decontamination. An overview of the various wroking groups

 

 

efforts since the last TANK briefing in April was provided. No recommendations were made. New OPSDEPS in attendance were hearing the subject briefed for the first time. Deficiencies in briefing centered largely on discussion of threat agents and vulnerability aspects associated with them; delivery aspects of threat agents . . . could be delivered by other than conventional means; priority of threat agents (AX more important/probably than others). OPSDEPS felt more information on "who,, should get vaccines in the future needed prior to briefing Chiefs on 30 Oct. Army to work at refining numbers and alternatives to proposed vaccination recommendations.

 

136.18 Oct 91 - Fifth meeting of the Biological Defense

Committee Meeting conducted by MG Del Rosso (AODCSOPS). Attended by Service representatives, Joint Staff and OSD staff members. Synopsis included review of the 9 Oct TANK session with comments centering on four areas: revised threat (focus on weaponization potential will be basis for future work efforts); refinement of personnel numbers (j5 is staffing force requirements matrix with CINCs . . . none of CINCs have reported on prioritization or the threat expected in AORS; development of risk alternatives (enhancement and incremental packages will be used to develop alternatives which will be briefed during 30 Oct TANK session); and proposed recommendations to be made part of the plan and briefed during 30 Oct TANK session. MG Del Rosso indicated the need to evaluate the future of the Commitee and asked if the Committee should continue to meet in order to keep the integrated program "on track." Time and location of next meeting, TBD.

ion, Biological Defense

Concept Plan, for use by DJS at OPSDEPS meeting on 30 Oct 91. Provided background information which was not covered by Army in their 9 October TANK briefing to the OPSDEPS. Paper will be used by LTC Hilliard (J5 Chem) to prebrief the DJS prior to next TANK session.

138.30 Oct 91 - TANK #10 session (updated information) provided by Army and DIA. Attempted to cover deficiencies in briefing from 9 Oct TANK.

 

 

 

agents. Threat agents were presented in descending order in

liklihood of development. Some clarification

questions ... briefing largely accepted by OPSDEPS. Real

question remains concerning the liklihood of use (either

covert or offensive). Army indicated psychologic-

most difficult to assess ... cannot measure intent,

potential.

 

* Second half of briefing conducted by Army was the up@ to the DOD Plan to Improve Biolgoical Defense. Discussed refinement of personnel requirements for three AORs and identification of alternatives to protect the 1995 force. Alternatives highlighted the unfunded estimates above core level and prompted questions regarding what was in the core program. Range of six options from $1318M to $1047M. VDJS still wants chemical separated from biological and clarification of use of "status quo." Army as executive agent for DOD pushing for alternative two which offers "alignment of CINC desires and is tailored to a realistic threat assessment, establishes a detection capability prior to the turn of the century and identifies the priorities and costs (above current funding levels) associated with improving BOB biological defenses."

 

 

* Army indicated he wanted to get on with vaccination program... and that alternative 2 did not meet this. was looking for JCS opinion on array of options. Doesn't know how forces will flow/rotate in/out theaters for vaccine policy to be developed. Closest we can do in meeting the requirements to protect the 1995 force is to vaccinate; other options require increase in dollars.

* AF wanted to know was the threat real and could we afford resources associated with ambitious plan. The "status quo,, shouldn't be inferred that nothing is being done.

* Navy didn't agree that vaccinations should not be given if vaccines are available ... protection/vaccination of individual may be high priority ... heavy price to pay for GOCO vaccine facility.

* DJS asked for ideas on how to improve briefing ... should portray options better so as to understand why dollars spent here are better than dollars spent there. Need to define what "protection" means. Consensus is that more work needed before next briefing/submittal to SECDEF.

 

139.15 Nov 91 - News article appearing in Army Times indicated a higher rate of miscarriages in wives of service members who had

 

received the botulinum pentavalent toxoid while servi@

Arabia. Responded to by Army. Conclusion was that the

considered safe and effective. Thre is no data to suggeb

the toxoid causes any problems in pregnant women or in mall child-bearing age.

140.27 Nov 91 - Army sent draft DOD Biological Defense Plan t(-

Joint Staff (J-5) for comment. This report was due to DEPSECDEF not later than 30 Nov 91. The plan addressed the near-term, high priority biological needs of the armed forces, including defense against AX and BT threat agents. Additionally, the plan provided enhancements to achieve an adequate biological defense for the 1995 force against the most probable biological warfare threats.

141.10 Dec 91 - Joint Staff comments to 27 Nov plan (staffed with Service planners) included comments on the threat section (too long); made clear that review by CINC action officers was not an established CINC position; emphasized that vaccine for BT remains deficient; recommended costs be carefully checked for all alternatives; requested more full explanation be given to what was in the core program (chemical and biological). The plan was only partially reflective of the discussion emanating from the 30 Oct TANK briefing. OSD comments were not as favorable and requested plan be reworked with OSD comments more fully integrated; plan needed clarification regarding specific milestones, funding requirements, recommendations backed by analysis. The set of options needed better organization so as to allow selection of best course of action. Two components of plan (peacetime vaccination and adequate vaccine production) should be immediately mplished.

 

 

 

 

 

142.7 Feb 92 - Final version of plan forwarded by CSA to CJCS for guidance before submission to SECARMY who will forward it to DEPSECDEF. Plan programmed (core) money for chemical/biological defense is $1.318B. identified comprehensive way to satisfy DEPSECDEF taskings by offering incremental packages of selected capabilities. Total unfinanced costs recommended are $962M. Key issues: Army has identified several alternatives having unprogrammed costs but has not restructured/reprogrammed core program or identified other sources to offset additional costs; there is no vaccination policy; there is a lack of consensus on the threat. Navy and Air Force do not see the same threat to their forces as do ground forces. Conclusions: Joint Staff should continue to support biological defense as a priority requirement; support construction of a scaled-back vaccine facility; support innoculation of special operations forces and selected early deploying forces; Army should coordinate fundi, and execution plan with Services and OSD; and CJCS should respo, to CSA supporting conclusions.

143.Feb 92 - CJCS letter sent to SECARMY on above comments.


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